







At the end of 2008, the escalating fi  nancial crisis drove 
most of the advanced countries into a severe recession. 
The emerging economies also suffered as capital fl  ows 
dried up and international trade collapsed. These devel-
opments caused global GDP to contract for the fi  rst time 
in decades, in contrast to the often very strong   economic 
expansion seen in previous years.
With the support of massive fi   scal recovery plans and 
extremely accommodating monetary policies, the global 
economy has gradually recovered. However, there is 
great uncertainty over how long it will take to regain a 
growth rate comparable to that seen before the crisis, or 
even whether that is possible, especially as that dynamic 
growth was based largely on macroeconomic distortions 
in a good many countries. Some western economies saw 
rapidly expanding credit, asset price bubbles and excep-
tionally low savings ratios, while a number of emerg-
ing countries featured relative price distortions, under-
developed fi  nancial markets and excessive levels of sav-
ings. The most obvious manifestation of these imbalances 
was found in the growing current account surpluses and 
defi  cits on the balance of payments. Many observers had 
for years been stressing that this situation was unsustain-
able. Moreover, there is a general consensus that these 
imbalances contributed to the outbreak of the fi  nancial 
crisis.
Recently there have been signs of shifts in global demand : 
some countries were harder hit than others by the fi  nan-
cial crisis, while some governments had greater fi   scal 
scope for adopting a recovery strategy. These shifts have 
led to a partial correction of the external imbalance. 
However, a vigorous and sustainable global economic 
recovery requires fundamentally more balanced growth 
of global demand, implying the permanent elimination of 
the inherent distortions in national growth profi  les. That 
is no easy task and will require a globally coordinated 
approach involving all regions of the world. The resolute 
commitment of the G20 leaders at the Pittsburgh summit 
at the end of September 2009 is grounds for optimism. 
In the Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced 
Growth, they agreed that countries with a current account 
defi  cit would endeavour to promote savings and embark 
on a path towards fi   scal consolidation. Consequently, 
those countries – and especially the United States – will 
cease to be world spenders of last resort for many years 
to come. It is therefore up to the countries with a surplus, 
primarily the Asian countries, to propel global demand. To 
that end, they need to strengthen “domestic sources of 
growth”, e.g. by a policy which curbs private savings and 
encourages a shift from the export industry in favour of 
the service sectors. Although a number of countries have 
already taken a series of measures representing a move 
in the right direction, the rebalancing of global demand 
will still require fundamental structural reforms in many 
areas and regions. Finding a new global balance is likely 
to be a lengthy process which could temporarily weaken 
economic growth. It will remain a central theme of inter-
national debate in the coming years.
This article is structured as follows. The fi   rst section 
discusses the development of distortions in some key 
regions and countries since the mid 1990s. The external 
imbalances were in fact symptoms of underlying internal 
distortions. The current account balances are therefore 
analysed taking account of the savings and investment 
decisions of individuals, businesses and governments. The 22
Chart 1  current account balanceS of SoMe key countrieS and econoMic regionS
(percentages of global GDP)
































Source  : IMF.
(1)  Hong Kong, Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Taiwan.
commitments given at the G20 summit in Pittsburgh are 
set out in the second section. Section 3 deals with the 
practical policy implications for countries with a deficit 
or surplus. Finally, section 4 examines to what extent the 
global economic recovery is already “strong, sustainable 
and balanced”, in accordance with the G20’s aims.
1.  Development of global imbalances
The global imbalances on the balance of payments cur-
rent account grew almost continuously from the second 
half of the 1990s until 2008. Among the deficit coun-
tries, the United States was the principal contributor to 
this phenomenon, acting as consumer of last resort. The 
countries in surplus include the fast-growing emerging 
Asian countries, especially China, but also Japan and the 
oil-exporting countries. The pattern of current account 
balances during this period is attributable to a multitude 
of factors, such as the low and declining savings ratio 
in the United States, the high and rising savings ratio in 
China, and the increase in oil prices.
Current account imbalances are not a source of concern 
in themselves. For instance, a country with lucrative 
investment opportunities can make good use of foreign 
savings as a source of funding. However, imbalances 
may prove to be a problem if they reflect underlying 
internal distortions, such as the asset price bubbles in the 
United States – causing American households to over-
estimate their wealth and inappropriately increase their 
consumption – or inadequate social security in China, 
encouraging Chinese households to step up their precau-
tionary savings.
It is generally acknowledged that the internal and exter-
nal imbalances also helped to trigger the financial crisis. 
The dollar’s status as an international reserve currency 
certainly made it easy for the United States to attract 
foreign investors to finance its current account deficit. 23
rebaLanCing gLobaL demand
It was principally the Asian countries that showed a 
marked preference for investing their surpluses in risk-
free assets in the form of US government bonds. In the 
United States, these massive capital flows combined with 
an extremely accommodating monetary policy stance 
were reflected in abundant liquidity and very low interest 
rates which led to a further decline in the already relatively 
low savings ratio of American households. Together with 
inadequate prudential supervision of the financial sector, 
these developments fostered the formation of speculative 
bubbles on asset markets, the emergence of new, risky 
financial products designed to achieve higher returns, and 
ultimately the financial crisis.
The situation in the United States, China and the euro 
area is described below. The oil-exporting countries are 
disregarded since the current account surplus of those 
countries is due almost exclusively to oil price fluctuations 
on international markets, rather than domestic factors. 
The movement in the current account balance is studied 
from the savings and investment angle, that being the 
best approach for exploring the link between external and 
internal imbalances  (1).
1.1  United States
current account balance and balance of SavingS 
and inveStMent
In the past fifteen years, the US balance of payments cur-
rent account presented a constant deficit which increased 
from under 2 p.c. of GDP in the mid 1990s to 6 p.c. of 
GDP in 2006. In the ensuing three years, the deficit more 
than halved. However, it is clear from the quarterly figures 
that it has grown again slightly since the second half of 
2009.
A sharp deterioration in the net savings of the private 
sector occurred in the second half of the 1990s  ; this 
was attributable both to households, which cut their sav-
ings and invested more in housing, and to firms which 
expanded their investment on the basis of their belief in 
the New Economy  (2). Though it helped to avoid the “twin 
deficit”, whereby an external deficit is accompanied by a 
budget deficit, from 1998 onwards, the consolidation of 
public finances during that same period did not prevent 
an increase in the borrowing requirement of the American 
economy as a whole.
In the initial years of the new millennium, there was a tem-
porary change in the macroeconomic context underlying 
the increase in the external financing requirement of the 
United States. The private sector borrowing requirement 
diminished, mainly as a result of the sharp dip in business 
investment after the bursting of the dotcom bubble. On 
the other hand, the general government financing capac-
ity was converted to a borrowing requirement on account 
of tax cuts and the increase in public spending. The twin 
deficit therefore reappeared.
During the period 2004-2006, there was again a modest 
decline in private net savings as a result of a revival in 
investment in housing and business investment, and the 
renewed fall in the household savings ratio. Conversely, 
the public sector borrowing requirement diminished, 
partly as a result of the increased revenues generated by 
the favourable economic climate.
From 2007 onwards, the current account deficit on the 
balance of payments began to decline, dropping to 
2.4 p.c. of GDP by mid 2009. That decline reflected a 
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Source  : Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA).
(1)  S-I expresses the difference between the savings and investment of a sector, 
i.e. net savings.
(2)  For statistical reasons, there is some disparity between the current account balance 
and the overall financing balance.
(1) From an accounting angle, the current account balance in fact corresponds to the 
balance of savings and investment. Cf. box in Eugène, B. and W. Melyn (2003). 
Other approaches concentrate on trade and capital flows.
(2) At the end of the 1990s, many economists and other observers considered 
that the use of new information and communication technologies (ICT) had 
accelerated American economic growth. This led to a rush to buy shares in 
dotcom companies, an increase in business investment and higher income 
expectations among households.24
marked improvement in private net savings. Owing to 
the crisis, households and firms cut down on their invest-
ment, and households stepped up their savings in order 
to rebuild their wealth. The improvement in the private 
sector balance offset the marked expansion of the general 
government borrowing requirement resulting from the 
economic and financial crisis.
From the second half of 2009, the current account deficit 
increased again  : the improvement in public finances was 
not enough to compensate for the deterioration in the 
balance of private savings and investment caused mainly 
by the fall in household savings.
houSehold SavingS
The deterioration in net savings and especially the decline 
in the household savings ratio was a major factor in the 
worsening US external balance examined above. The 
household savings ratio dropped from just over 7 p.c. of 
net disposable income in the early 1990s to 1.4 p.c. in 
2005. The literature proposes a number of explanatory 
factors, such as the increase in net wealth of households, 
easier access to credit, the low real interest rates and 
higher income expectations.
The net wealth of households grew strongly, from around 
490 p.c. of their net disposable income in the mid 1990s 
to 631 p.c. in 2006. That growth was due to the steep rise 
in the value of their assets, which subsequently proved 
to be overblown. Share prices rose strongly at first, and 
property prices then strengthened substantially. In view of 
the strong growth of their wealth, American households 
felt less need to save. During the financial crisis, between 
late 2007 and early 2009, those net assets contracted 
by 25 p.c. following the sharp downward correction of 
property prices and share prices. From the second quarter 
of 2009, wealth began rising again, mainly as a result of 
a partial stock market recovery. However, at the beginning 
of 2010, it was still worth about 17 p.c. less than before 
the crisis.
The various financial market innovations giving house-
holds easier access to credit are a second factor which 
depressed the savings ratio. Those innovations include 
the liberalisation of the mortgage loan market and the 
growing use of credit cards, which led to excessive easing 
of lending conditions (e.g. subprime mortgages). The 
ratio between households’ debts and their net disposable 
income increased from around 90 p.c. in the mid 1990s 
to 135 p.c. in 2007, essentially as a result of the growing 
volume of mortgage loans. The crisis led to a slight fall 
in that ratio, though it remains high : at the beginning of 
2010 it stood at around 126 p.c., so that most observers 
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Sources  : BEA, Standard & Poor’s, Thomson Reuters Datastream.
(1)  Wilshire 5000 index.
(2)  Case-Shiller national price index.
consider it desirable for American households to continue 
reducing their debt ratio.
Higher income expectations owing to the stronger growth 
of productivity in the US between the mid 1990s and 
the mid 2000s (New Economy) may also have influenced 
household savings. According to the permanent income 
hypothesis, household consumption is in fact determined 
not only by current income but also by expected future 
income.
A final factor often mentioned to explain the downward 
trend in the savings ratio is the decline in real interest 
rates to historically low levels. A number of developments 
played a role here. On the one hand, interest rates were 
depressed by the substantial surplus savings built up in 
emerging Asian economies since the 1997-1998 crisis, 
and in oil-exporting countries since the surge in oil prices. 
This “savings glut”, as it was called by the Federal Reserve 
Chairman, Ben Bernanke, was invested mainly in US gov-
ernment bonds. Also, following the bursting of the stock 
market bubble in 2000-2001, the Federal Reserve main-
tained an accommodating interest rate policy for a long 
time, since the credibility of that policy and cheap imports 
from Asia exerted a moderating effect on consumer prices. 
Discouraged by the low interest rates, households rejected 
savings in favour of investment and consumption.25
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private conSuMer Spending aS the engine of 
growth
The decline in the household savings ratio is reflected in 
the dynamism of household consumption. In the past 
two decades, private consumer spending has made a 
greater contribution to GDP growth than in the past  ; 
that contribution is estimated at over 80 p.c. on average 
in the 2000s. The contribution of the other components 
was much more modest. An international comparison 
of the share of private consumption expenditure in GDP 
also reveals the relative importance of this expenditure 
category in the US, compared to most other advanced 
economies. Moreover, the gap in relation to other coun-
tries widened steadily in the past twenty years as a result 
of the increase in the relative share of this expenditure 
category in the United States and its stabilisation, or even 
decline, in most other countries.
1.2  China
current account balance and net SavingS
The current account balance of China’s balance of pay-
ments increased from 1.7 p.c. of GDP in 2000 to a peak of 
11 p.c. in 2007, before subsiding somewhat in 2008. The 
substantial current account surplus since the mid 2000s 
reflects excess savings in relation to investment, though 
that certainly does not imply a low level of investment  : 
quite the contrary. In international terms, China is investing 
exceptionally heavily. The extremely rapid accumulation of 
capital began in the late 1990s. Since then, gross fixed 
capital formation has increased faster, on average, than 
economic growth, so that its share of GDP rose from 
33 p.c. in 1995 to 42 p.c. in 2008, double the average 
level in other countries. Moreover, domestic savings are 
amply sufficient to finance investment, unlike in India, for 
example, a country which also has a relatively high invest-
ment ratio but is obliged to rely on foreign capital. As a 
result, China has a sizeable current account surplus while 
India records a deficit. Furthermore, the national savings 
ratio has risen faster than the investment ratio, increasing 
from 36.7 p.c. of GDP in 1995 to almost 50 p.c. of GDP 
in 2007. Firms, the public sector and households have all 
contributed to the rise in the savings ratio.
corporate and houSehold SavingS
Between 1995 and 2007, corporate savings increased 
by 2.6 percentage points of GDP. With a combination of 
particularly low production costs and limited competi-
tion, China greatly increased its market share. Chinese 
businesses, including a large number in the public 
sector, were consequently able to make huge profits. 
At the same time, they pursued a policy of paying low 
dividends, and thus contributed to the increase in the 
national savings ratio. Owing to the rapid pace of eco-
nomic growth and the expansion of the export market, 
particularly after China joined the WTO in 2001, it is 
hardly surprising that most State enterprises opted to 
invest their profits in expanding capacity. Corporate 
investment growth actually outpaced the rise in corpo-
rate savings.
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Source  : World Bank (World Development Indicators).26
Chart 5  diSpoSable incoMe, SavingS and 
conSuMption of houSeholdS in china
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Sources  : CEIC, IMF.
The share of households in the national savings ratio 
increased by only 0.9 percentage point of GDP over the 
same period 1995-2007. This increase was the outcome 
of two opposing movements, namely a rise in the house-
hold savings ratio in relation to disposable income, and a 
decline in household income as a percentage of national 
income : having remained stable between 1995 and 2001, 
the Chinese household savings ratio in terms of dispos-
able income increased steadily to reach 38 p.c. in 2007, 
while the share of household disposable income in GDP 
declined from 66.6 p.c. in 2001 to 57 p.c. in 2007.
The relatively recent rise in the propensity of Chinese 
households to save – in proportion to their disposable 
income – is probably due to demographic factors, accord-
ing to the life cycle hypothesis  : while consumption is 
spread throughout a person’s entire life, income is con-
centrated during working life. This means that individuals 
tend to dissave when young, then accumulate capital by 
saving more during their working life, and can draw on 
that capital once they retire. The increase in the popula-
tion at working age in relation to the total population in 
China during recent decades could therefore explain the 
high household savings ratio. Moreover, according to this 
same theory, the savings ratio rises more steeply when 
income increases particularly fast. That applies to coun-
tries with a modest standard of living which, like China, 
are in the initial stages of a catching-up process, because 
that income growth could principally benefit people in 
the age group of working people who are building up 
savings. The pattern of Chinese household savings may 
also be due to the erosion of the social security safety 
net, especially the disappearance of the “iron rice bowl”, 
namely the cradle-to-grave provision by the State. That 
triggered a rise in precautionary savings intended to 
cover the risks and costs relating to health, retirement 
and education. Finally, financial under-development is 
also a factor, given that it is difficult for households to 
obtain loans.
inveStMent and exportS aS the engine of growth
Apart from households’ increased propensity to save, the 
decline in disposable income of households as a percent-
age of national income also depressed the share of private 
consumption in GDP. This change in the national distribu-
tion of income is the direct consequence of the promotion 
of a growth model centred on investment and exports 
favourable to large, State-privileged, capital-intensive 
enterprises in manufacturing industry, but unfavourable 
to firms active in sectors using abundant labour, such as 
SMEs in services. In contrast to the latter firms, which 
had only limited access to external finance and were thus 
forced to build up substantial reserves in order to carry 
out their investment projects, large public enterprises in 
the industrial sector geared to exports had easy access 
to cheap loans from State banks. Moreover, with a sub-
sidised energy supply, those enterprises were able to cut 
their production costs even further. The loss of millions 
of jobs in the labour-intensive agricultural sector also cre-
ated a surplus supply of labour. It weakened the workers’ 
collective bargaining position which had already been 
impaired by State control of the unions. This probably pre-
vented wages from keeping pace with productivity gains, 
especially at the lower end of the income scale. However, 
the fall in household income as a percentage of national 
income is not due solely to the movement in labour 
incomes but also to the low level of savings incomes, a 
reason being the low deposit interest rate.
Although China’s growth was export led, the direct con-
tribution of net exports to economic growth averaged 
only 1.1 percentage points per annum between 2000 and 
2008. However, the contribution of exports to growth is 
much larger than suggested by the net export figures in 
the national accounts. Here, net exports are a misleading 
indicator in that they are equal to exports minus total 
imports, whereas the balance of exports minus export-
related imports would give a more accurate picture of 
export dependence. Furthermore, China’s real depend-
ence on exports is actually even greater, given that a large 
proportion of investment occurred in export-oriented 27
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sectors. If this last factor is taken into account, China’s 
dependence on exports increases from 27 to 42 p.c. of 
GDP in 2008. That phenomenon is evident throughout 
Asia  : export dependence increases by an average of 
10 percentage points if export-related investment is taken 
into account.
To sum up, it can be said that the capital-intensive 
enterprise sector centred on exports dominated national 
income, savings and investment, and that helped to 
create a vicious circle of capacity expansion followed by 
government export promotion measures aiming to absorb 
the increase in capacity. The decision to go for capital-
intensive rather than labour-intensive growth means 
that enterprises account for an ever-increasing share of 
national income. Chinese households were also forced to 
“subsidise” investment in infrastructure and in industry 
via a low deposit interest rate. However, that does not 
mean that Chinese households have become poorer. On 
the contrary, they have become richer, but at a much 
slower rate than the country as a whole, so that their 
share in national income has declined.
In other words, there has been a massive transfer of 
wealth from consumers to producers, preventing Chinese 
private consumption from growing in proportion to GDP. 
Thus, the share of private consumption in GDP declined 
sharply, from 46 p.c. in 2000 to just 36 p.c. in 2007, com-
pared to 70 to 80 p.c. in many advanced economies and 
50 to 60 p.c. in most Asian countries ; in 1985 it still stood 
at 52 p.c. A rebalancing of the Chinese economy entails 
increasing the share of private consumption in GDP, rather 
than aiming at consumption growth. Private consumption 
therefore needs to grow considerably faster than GDP in 
order to initiate that rebalancing  : if private consumption 
is to equal 40 p.c. of GDP over the next five years (and 
even that is an exceptionally low percentage), consump-
tion would have to increase by 11 p.c. per annum given 
annual economic growth averaging 8 p.c. Such an out-
come entails a major adjustment to the Chinese growth 
model, and that will take time.
1.3  Euro area
The euro area’s current account is more or less in balance, 
yet that masks significant disparities between Member 
States. In the past decade, Germany, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Austria and Finland have built up surpluses 
while Greece, Spain, Portugal and Cyprus have accumu-
lated heavy deficits. The differences are due mainly to 
varying trends in these countries’ competitiveness and in 
domestic demand.
First, opposing movements in the form of gains or losses 
of competitiveness were reflected in a corresponding 
improvement or deterioration in the trade balance and 
hence in the current account. Thanks to wage moderation 
and productivity gains, countries such as Germany and 
Austria became more competitive while other countries 
became less so. In Spain and Italy, for example, a failure 
to adjust wages in line with lower productivity gains 
impaired their ability to compete on price  ; in Greece, 
other factors also played a role, such as a less favourable 
export mix or geographical focus of exports.
Next, opposing domestic growth forces contributed to con-
trasting movements in the current account balances. While 
domestic demand was relatively sluggish in the surplus 
countries, strong domestic demand in the deficit countries, 
particularly Ireland, Greece and Spain, fostered vigorous 
growth, outpacing the euro area average. In fact, some 
deficit countries benefited greatly from the convergence 
of interest rates in the run-up to monetary unification. 
However, the relatively low level of interest rates (compared 
to the past) led to excessive expansion of credit, especially 
mortgage loans, which in turn fuelled a property market 
boom, principally in Ireland and Spain. Despite the result-
ing high level of private debt (in Spain, Greece and Ireland, 
lending to households increased by annual average of 
19, 26 and 24 p.c. respectively between 2003 and 2007), 
wealth effects combined with substantial wage increases 
triggered strong domestic demand, and hence substan-
tial demand for imported goods, which in a number of 
Member States led to sizeable current account deficits.




















































































Source  : EC.28
Finally, lax fiscal policy accelerated the formation of defi-
cits in some euro area countries. In Portugal and Greece, 
in particular, an extremely expansionary fiscal policy led 
to the emergence of a twin deficit problem. Since 1999, 
public finances of Spain and Ireland have been sound 
overall but that situation was suddenly reversed in the 
aftermath of the crisis.
Germany holds a special position among the surplus 
countries  : not only is it the biggest economy in the euro 
area, it has actually accumulated substantial surpluses by 
global standards. The positive current account balance 
recorded in the past decade is due to strong competitive-
ness and structurally low private consumption over many 
years.
In the early 1990s, German unification gave a strong 
boost to economic activity, but it culminated in over-
heating of the economy and a loss of competitiveness. 
Unification also placed a heavy burden on Germany’s 
public finances, and that was reflected in heavier taxation 
and a rise in social security contributions. Similarly, the 
construction sector – which had built up excess capacity 
in the 1990s – experienced a recession which persisted 
for over ten years. The impact of these shocks was long-
lasting, the labour market was hard hit and employment 
stagnated for many years, which accounts to a large 
extent for the low level of consumption. Unlike other euro 
area countries, Germany also recorded a rise in the house-
hold savings ratio from the year 2000  ; this was partly 
precautionary, in response to a pension system reform.
Since the turn of the millennium, however, wage mod-
eration has restored competitiveness so that Germany 
has increased its market share, particularly in the emerg-
ing economies, the oil-exporting countries and Eastern 
Europe, where demand for German investment goods 
has soared.
2.  Need for international coordination 
to deal with global imbalances
Against the backdrop of a virtually continuous increase in 
global imbalances since the second half of the 1990s, a 
consensus emerged around 2005 on the need for coor-
dinated policy adjustments in the leading economies in 
order to achieve an orderly reduction in these imbalances. 
One of the main concerns was that the external debt 
position of the United States would lead to a loss of con-
fidence in the dollar, causing the collapse of the currency. 
In 2006 the IMF therefore initiated multilateral consulta-
tions (Multilateral Consultation on Global Imbalances) 
between Saudi Arabia, China, the United States, Japan 
and the euro area. In April 2007, an agreement was 
concluded on a number of essential policy adjustments  (1). 
These included an increase in savings in the United States, 
measures to promote growth in Europe, reforms designed 
to stimulate domestic demand in the emerging Asian 
countries and greater exchange rate flexibility in a number 
of countries with a current account surplus on the balance 
of payments. However, the major part of the agreement 
was never implemented.
The financial crisis once again demonstrated the impor-
tance of international policy coordination. More particu-
larly, the G20  (2) (which succeeded the G7) played a role in 
coordinating the measures to combat the crisis. In view of 
the success of that approach, the G20 also presided over 
the preparations for the international policy response to 
the challenges of the 21st century in a number of specific 
areas, such as energy, climate change, financial regula-
tion and economic growth. In this last area, collaboration 
was put on a formal footing at the Pittsburgh summit in 
September 2009 in the Framework for Strong, Sustainable 
and Balanced Growth  (3). Its aim is to define the general 
outline of a coherent medium-term strategy for achieving 
such growth and avoiding futures crises. “Sustainable” 
means that growth must be compatible with sound public 
finances, financial stability and price stability, and a range 
of social and environmental objectives. “Balanced” means 
that global economic growth is supported by all G20 
countries and all the regions of the world.
The Framework’s initial recommendations were largely in 
line with those of the Multilateral Consultation on Global 
Imbalances. It was first agreed that the G20 members 
with structural current account deficits would take steps 
to increase savings in the private sector, strengthen their 
export sectors and make a start on fiscal consolidation. 
Also, the G20 members with a structural surplus would 
adopt measures to stimulate internal sources of growth. 
Depending on the national context, that could mean an 
increase in investment, a gradual reduction in the distor-
tions apparent on financial markets, productivity growth 
in the service sector, an improvement in the social security 
system and, more generally, elimination of the factors 
depressing expenditure.
It was also agreed that the G20 members would share 
their policy plans and projections and their growth 
forecasts in a Mutual Assessment Process and would 
(1)  IMF (2007).
(2)  The G20 was formed in Berlin in December 1999 following the Asia crisis, in 
order to bring together systemically important advanced and emerging countries 
to discuss global economic issues. The group comprises the EU and 19 countries : 
Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, 
Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Turkey, 
the United Kingdom and the United States.
(3)  G20 (2009a).29
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examine whether these conform to the overall objective 
of strong, sustainable and balanced growth. At the end 
of January 2010, each G20 member presented a national 
policy plan and medium-term growth forecasts (3 to 5 
years) on which basis the IMF calculated a growth sce-
nario for the global economy. That scenario was consid-
ered over-optimistic, and it was also thought that too little 
had been done to address various structural problems. 
At the G20 summit held in Toronto in June, with respect 
to fiscal consolidation the advanced G20 economies 
then undertook to at least halve their deficits by 2013. 
By 2016, they will also begin to stabilise or reduce their 
debt ratio. Several emerging countries were once again 
requested to conduct reforms to strengthen social secu-
rity, develop their financial markets and augment their 
exchange rate flexibility.
The move to establish a Framework together with a 
Mutual Assessment is already more ambitious than the 
Multilateral Consultation. Nevertheless, the countries 
concerned have yet to implement the suggested policy 
adjustments. In view of the inevitable national political 
pressure associated with domestic rebalancing, there is 
a risk that some countries may want to shift the burden 
of those adjustments onto others. Thus, countries with a 
deficit could be tempted to impose measures to restrict 
imports, such as import levies, or to carry out competitive 
devaluations. Countries with a substantial public debt may 
be inclined to use inflation to facilitate the debt reduction 
process. Others will continue to promote their exports at 
all costs. The international debate on the exchange rate 
policy of some countries seems far from over.
3.  Global economic rebalancing and 
policy implications
3.1  United States
In accordance with the recommendations made at the 
G20 summit in Pittsburgh, the US authorities had already 
outlined last year their strategy for rebalancing the 
American economy. The Economic Report of the President 
published early this year confirmed that outline and filled 
in the details  (1). In practice, policy-makers want future 
growth to be based more on exports and investment in 
equipment and software rather than on private consump-
tion and investment in housing. The report contains a set 
of proposals for achieving that aim.
Thus, in February 2010, President Obama announced 
measures designed to double exports of goods and 
services in nominal terms over the next five years. In that 
regard, the launch of a National Export Initiative (NEI) is 
crucial. First, more financial resources will be made avail-
able for promoting exports. Second, an Export Promotion 
Cabinet will be set up, comprising representatives of vari-
ous public bodies, with the task of devising a detailed plan 
to stimulate exports. Finally, greater attention will focus 
on eliminating trade barriers in order to open up foreign 
markets to American businesses. The reinstatement of the 
President's Export Council is another initiative designed to 
support exports. It brings together business leaders and 
union representatives, and its job is to advise the govern-
ment on export promotion.
Most observers think that these measures will be insuffi-
cient. It is evident from historical data covering the period 
1970-1995 that doubling the value of exports in the 
space of five years was only occasionally achieved during 
periods of strong inflation in the 1970s. Studies have 
shown that sustained growth of the main trading partners 
is essential, and that a sharp dollar depreciation may also 
help to attain the objective.
Moreover, it must be remembered that American firms 
were the first to offshore their production. One reason 
could be the relatively high rate of corporation tax in the 
United States, which stood at 39 p.c. in 2009, compared  (1)  Council of Economic Advisors (2010).
Chart 7  SaleS by foreign SubSidiarieS of aMerican 
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to an average of 25.9 p.c. in the euro area, for example. 
Many products are designed in the United States and 
manufactured abroad. Offshoring therefore led to ero-
sion of industrial production facilities and impaired export 
capability. Although the same phenomenon is seen in 
other advanced countries, it seems to have a greater 
impact in the United States. Figures compiled by the 
BEA show that sales by foreign subsidiaries of American 
companies have soared since the early 1990s, so that, by 
2007, they were three times the value of US exports of 
goods and services. That ratio is higher than in most other 
advanced countries.
The Economic Report of the President also stresses the 
importance of innovation in sustaining economic activity 
and employment. Among other measures taken for that 
purpose, the resources of a number of public institutions 
promoting research and development will be increased, 
and a tax credit designed to encourage innovation will be 
made permanent.
The report likewise considers that the establishment of 
new, stricter regulations for the financial sector is a crucial 
factor in the domestic rebalancing of economic growth. 
The aim is to avoid the excesses of the past – such as the 
very easy credit terms – and to prevent a new financial 
crisis. In July, President Obama signed a financial reform 
plan (Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act) 
comprising a whole range of measures which now need 
to be specified in detail by the regulatory authorities. The 
main provisions concern creating an agency in charge of 
consumer protection in the financial sector, giving the 
regulatory authorities the power to dismantle financial 
institutions which fail to fulfil their obligations and to pass 
on a larger percentage of the costs to the surviving com-
petitors, introducing stricter regulations on the market in 
derivatives, strengthening the capital requirements and 
restricting the own account activity permissible for finan-
cial institutions (the “Volcker Rule”).
Regarding another G20 recommendation – the con-
solidation of public finances – there is an article on exit 
strategies in this Economic Review. So far, Congress has 
only approved a few specific measures, but the President 
has already made a number of proposals which indicate 
the intended route. At the beginning of February 2010, 
the Obama administration unveiled its strategy on public 
finances up to the year 2020, together with the federal 
budget for the year 2011. Those forecasts were updated 
at the end of July on the occasion of the mid-session 
budget review. The federal public deficit is set to fall from 
10 p.c. of GDP in 2010 to 9.2 p.c. of GDP in 2011. The 
budget path for the next ten years reflects the govern-
ment’s aim of cutting the deficit to 3.4 p.c. of GDP in 
2018. The deficit is then expected to begin rising again to 
3.8 p.c. in 2020 owing to the increased costs associated 
with population ageing. According to the budget propos-
als, the federal public debt will increase from 53 p.c. of 
GDP during 2009 to 77.4 p.c. in 2020. According to the 
OECD’s spring 2010 forecasts, total public debt is likely to 
grow from 83 p.c. of GDP in 2009 to 94.8 p.c. in 2011.
In addition, for the purpose of shaping fiscal policy a bipar-
tite commission has been created (National Commission 
on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform), with the task of 
formulating concrete proposals by the beginning of 
December with a view to more radical consolidation. The 
Commission’s principal tasks are to restore the primary 
balance to equilibrium by 2015 and to propose additional 
measures to ensure the long-term sustainability of public 
finances.
Furthermore, the PAYGO rule was reintroduced. This rule 
stipulates that new spending programmes or new tax 
cuts must be offset by savings or tax increases on other 
items. The rule will help to support the necessary budget-
ary effort.
3.2  China
In the mid 2000s, the Chinese authorities also began to 
recognise the risks inherent in maintaining their exist-
ing growth model. In 2006, the eleventh five-year pro-
gramme already explicitly called for a change of direction. 
That awareness was also apparent in the speech by the 
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao in March 2007  : he 
expressed the fear that the Chinese economy could suffer 
structural problems making its development “unstable, 
unbalanced, uncoordinated and unsustainable”. The 
global consequences of the financial crisis and its impact 
on Chinese export markets reinforced the arguments in 
favour of directing growth towards domestic demand 
rather than exports. In addition, the Chinese leaders 
realise that social and political stability can no longer be 
ensured by the strategy which has prevailed hitherto. 
It is time to find a solution to the increasing income 
inequality between urban and rural regions, the coastal 
areas and the hinterland, and the low skilled and highly 
skilled. Apart from an increase in the relative weight of 
domestic demand in growth, more balanced growth 
therefore also implies greater geographical dispersion of 
economic activity and a fairer distribution of incomes. The 
new economic objective – production for the Chinese 
people themselves – implies above all that the Chinese 
must have sufficient purchasing power in order to be 
able to consume. Structural reforms designed to increase 
the share of households in national income, to bolster 31
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domestic (service) sectors and develop social security in 
order to rein in the precautionary savings of households 
are therefore essential. Finally, exchange rate policy may 
also provide support. Although significant reforms are 
being introduced – and some are already in progress – it 
could be that the desired effect on the share of consump-
tion in the economy will be modest. In the meantime, 
the government has the option of speedier solutions, 
such as an immediate increase in pensions  : on 1 January 
2010, China increased the basic pensions of all workers 
by around 10 p.c., for the fifth consecutive year. Also the 
series of pay increases that the government granted in the 
spring of 2010 confirms that China is adopting a change 
of course. The pay increases are entirely in line with a 
transition to growth centred on consumption, driven by 
an expanding middle class.
a policy aiMed at Support for houSehold incoMeS 
and developMent of the Service Sector
It is vital to develop China’s financial sector, which still 
suffers from a number of defects. First, the cap on bank 
deposit interest rates means that savings incomes are very 
low, or even negative in real terms. Also, most of the 
capital channelled through the financial sector goes to 
State-owned industrial enterprises. Easier access to credit 
for SMEs and households, accompanied by prudential 
regulation and supervision, could encourage the neces-
sary investment in the service sector and reduce the need 
for precautionary savings.
It may also be desirable to reorientate fiscal policy. The 
government’s recent efforts  (1) in that regard aimed at 
boosting household income and reducing income inequal-
ity, thereby stimulating consumption, have already proved 
effective. The government could maintain that momen-
tum by further reducing the tax burden on labour and 
consumption and by increasing transfers to low incomes.
Finally, the transition to more balanced growth, less 
dependent on industry – which is highly capital inten-
sive – and centred more on highly labour-intensive sectors 
is vital in order to increase the share of wages in national 
income and to stimulate private consumption. In its elev-
enth five-year plan, the government adopted the aim of 
increasing the share of the service sector in the economy. 
Although the economic crisis diverted the government’s 
attention towards supporting the export-centred sectors, 
it stands by its intention of moving towards an economy 
based on services, as is evident from the initiatives in sup-
port of SMEs.
a better Social Security Safety net which curbS 
precautionary SavingS
In recent years, owing to an inadequate social security 
system covering pensions, unemployment benefits and 
health care combined with the absence of appropriate 
forms of private insurance, households have tried to 
make provision for themselves by setting aside a large 
part of their disposable income. The liberalisation of the 
economy in fact heralded the end of the “iron rice bowl” 
policy. In the past, State enterprises were responsible for 
paying out lifelong social benefits to their workers, but 
when the reforms were introduced in the mid 1990s, 
the State relieved those enterprises of that obligation in 
order to make them more competitive, and transferred 
the responsibility to the local authorities, who frequently 
ignored it as the corresponding funding was not trans-
ferred to them. In other words, the provinces were given 
a new responsibility but no additional resources. The 
provision of services therefore varies greatly from one 
region to another. Also, this system causes problems in a 
country where migration is constantly increasing  : under 
the hukou system, migrants cannot transfer their social 
entitlements because they are tied to official registration 
in their province of origin  ; the host provinces or towns 
do not want to take responsibility for their social security. 
Workers who move a long way away from their place of 
origin are therefore abandoned to their fate. The govern-
ment would like to reform the hukou system, but that is 
a hotly debated issue between the various levels of power 
in China. New regulations came into force on 1 January 
2010, but only concern the maintenance of pension 
entitlements for people moving to a different province. In 
June 2010, the Chinese government also brought in new 
regulations on the transfer of dividends on State shares to 
the National Social Security Fund. That decision will foster 
the continued development of the social security system, 
and therefore reduce the propensity of households to 
accumulate precautionary savings.
Total expenditure on health care in China has risen steeply 
in recent years, though in international terms it is still 
relatively low (4.8 p.c. of GDP in 2008, whereas the OECD 
average stood at 8.6 p.c.). During the 1990s, this rise 
was accompanied by an increase in the proportion paid 
for by the consumer, which rose from 35 p.c. in 1990 to 
over 60 p.c. in 2001. In order to alleviate to some extent   
this financial burden on citizens, the Chinese government 
had already launched a series of reforms in 2003, which 
brought down the share of private expenditure in total 
health care spending even further to 54 p.c. in 2007. 
That figure is not particularly high in comparison with 
other Asian countries, but it is high in relation to west-
ern Europe where the average is no more than 25 p.c. 
(1)  In response to the crisis, the Chinese government decided to increase social 
security expenditure and grant tax cuts in order to support private consumption, 
devoting 2 to 3 p.c. of GDP to those measures.32
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Conversely, the proportion of the population covered by 
social security increased from barely 10 p.c. in 2003 to 
over 80 p.c. in 2008. The aim of the health care reform 
plan announced in June 2009, for which the government 
is ready to release 820 billion renminbi, is to achieve a 
proportion of 90 p.c. in 2011  ; that plan is also linked 
to other reforms intended to improve the medical infra-
structure and services by 2020, as a shift in the financial 
burden from households to the government needs to be 
accompanied by an improvement in health care quality, 
failing which households will continue to save in order to 
be able to afford better services elsewhere.
Households spend five times as much on education as 
they do on health care. The government only provides 
free education at primary and secondary level  ; on   
average, the cost of one year at university represents half 
the annual disposable income of an average Chinese 
household. The fact that the government does not fund 
that education is therefore a key reason for saving, 
especially as the Chinese are reluctant to incur debts 
in order to finance their studies. China has developed 
two types of student loan, but the take-up is low.   
Overall, the current system of funding education is 
hampering the development of a workforce with higher 
education qualifications.
exchange rate policy
Finally, an appreciation of the renminbi could increase the 
purchasing power of Chinese households, both directly 
and via a shift away from the export industry towards 
the service sector, which is labour intensive. The realloc- 
ation of production resources will take a while anyway, 
and there could be some repercussions on growth and 
employment in the meantime.
However, it is mainly other countries that criticise 
China’s exchange rate policy. The dramatic export 
growth, the persistent surplus on the trade balance 
and the exponential growth of the foreign exchange 
reserves are commonly regarded as signs that the 
renminbi is undervalued. Some people, especially in 
America, view a stronger renminbi as the solution to 
the US trade deficit. However, it is uncertain whether 
a revaluation would have the desired effect on the 
American economy. The fact that the United States 
also has deficits with many countries other than China 
tends to suggest that American industry is in a weak 
competitive position. Moreover, the United States and 
China are relatively different producers. Thanks to low 
wages, China plays a significant role as an assembler in 
the regional production chain in Asia. In contrast, the 33
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United States is more in competition with Japan and the 
EU. All the same, on 19 June 2010, the Chinese central 
bank announced that it would “increase the flexibility of 
the renminbi exchange rate”. Following that relaxation 
of monetary policy, the exchange rate can now fluctuate 
daily within a range of 0.5 p.c. on either side of the cen-
tral rate, which will be adjusted periodically. However, in 
the first two months, the renminbi appreciated by only 
0.6 p.c. against the dollar.
3.3  Euro area
Although the crisis reduced the current account deficits 
and surpluses of the various euro area countries, that 
correction was due partly to cyclical factors, such as the 
collapse of world trade. The correction could therefore 
be merely temporary, and could be wiped out altogether 
when the economic recovery gathers strength. As dem-
onstrated by the events of recent months, persistent 
distortions threaten the economic and financial stability 
of individual Member States, undermine confidence in the 
euro and impair the euro area’s cohesion, because com-
mercial and financial channels transmit shocks between 
Member States.
Deficit countries need to become more competitive, e.g. 
via wage moderation and by shifting the means of pro-
duction towards the export sectors. Conversely, countries 
in surplus need to boost the growth potential of the sec-
tors of their economy which are not geared to exports. 
That is the way to achieve a more balanced growth 
dynamic and become less dependent on exports while 
also supporting the rebalancing of deficit countries both 
in the euro area and elsewhere.
Responsibility for these vital measures rests mainly with 
the Member States, in view of their national powers, 
e.g. in regard to employment policy. Moreover, these 
measures must be adapted to each country in view of the 
varying situations which they face. Nevertheless, policy 
coordination could alleviate the economic cost of those 
adjustments. The present situation is an unprecedented 
opportunity for improving the EU’s economic govern-
ance. The first move should be to improve fiscal policy 
supervision under the existing Stability Pact. Next, there 
should be better monitoring of macroeconomic imbal-
ances, in order to avoid them or at least take appropriate 
action to address them if they do occur. That monitoring 
should accompany fiscal supervision. Finally, it is nec-
essary to develop crisis management procedures. The 
Van Rompuy working group will submit proposals on that 
subject in the autumn of 2010 (see the box in Article 3 
in this Review).
Gradual macroeconomic rebalancing is crucial to eco-
nomic recovery. Many governments have already started a 
fiscal consolidation strategy (cf. Article 3 in this Economic 
Review) and are aware of the need for structural reforms 
boosting growth potential in order to support fiscal 
discipline.
4.  Towards a smooth rebalancing ?
partial correction of external iMbalanceS 
between countrieS
The financial crisis led to a partial correction of external 
imbalances between countries. Surplus countries focus-
ing on exports, such as Germany, China and Japan, were 
hard hit by the collapse of international trade  : in 2009, 
their current account surplus contracted by 4, 2.5 and 
0.7 percentage points of GDP respectively. Germany and 
Japan suffered in particular from the considerable impact 
which the crisis had on demand for investment goods and 
consumer durables. In view of the decline in demand for 
oil and the price of Brent, the surplus of the oil-exporting 
countries expressed in dollars also slumped by around 
80 p.c. in 2009. Conversely, the oil bill of the oil-importing 
countries was down. In the United States, the weakness 
of domestic demand and its impact on imports – out-
weighing the impact on exports of the decline in foreign 
demand – led to a marked fall in the current account 
deficit, reducing it from a peak of 6 p.c. of GDP in 2006 
to 2.7 p.c. of GDP in 2009.
The contraction of global demand therefore led to a cor-
rection of external imbalances. Part of that correction 
was only temporary. The cyclical upswing in mid 2009 
triggered a revival in commodity prices and interna-
tional trade. American households benefited from the 
asset market rebound. In China and India, growth soon 
returned to its high pre-crisis rate. In contrast, in mid 
2010, the recovery remained modest and uncertain in the 
United States, the euro area and Japan. Will this hitherto 
patchy recovery ultimately lead to strong, balanced and 
sustainable growth of the global economy in line with the 
aim of the G20 Framework ?
SuStainable growth ?
In many countries, growth has hitherto been supported 
by monetary policy and massive fiscal recovery measures. 
Eventually, the latter measures will be phased out in 
view of the risk to the sustainability of public finances. 
Consequently, the centre of gravity will have to shift 
from public to private demand. Countries will have to 
start by spelling out their medium-term consolidation 34
programmes. A credible consolidation plan is the only 
thing that will restore the confidence of businesses, con-
sumers and investors. Events in Greece and some other 
euro area countries have shown the potential repercus-
sions of diminished confidence in the financial markets on 
the sustainability of public finances. Moreover, that finan-
cial sustainability will come under even greater pressure 
in the future in the context of population ageing in most 
of the western economies. It is also vital that consolida-
tion should not impair growth. Cuts in public consump-
tion generally have a less adverse effect on growth than 
tax increases or cuts in public investment. Although the 
consolidation measures which the governments of many 
advanced economies will have to adopt in the coming 
years could put the brakes on growth for a time, there is 
no alternative (cf. Article 3 in this Economic Review).
balanced growth ?
Balanced global growth also requires a more general rebal-
ancing of demand. The centre of gravity of that demand 
will therefore have to be transferred from the deficit 
countries to the surplus countries. In order to rebuild their 
wealth, which were seriously impaired by the crisis, and to 
reduce their debts, American households increased their 
savings ratio to 7.2 p.c. of net disposable income in mid 
2009, after an absolute low of 1.2 p.c. in 2005 Q3. The 
ratio has since subsided again, falling to around 6.2 p.c. by 
the beginning of 2010. Be that as it may, recent forecasts 
by American and international bodies predict that, in the 
years ahead, the savings ratio will be structurally higher 
than it was before the financial crisis, as American house-
holds realise that sharp asset price corrections could occur, 
even if they are infrequent. Expectations of high returns on 
the stock market and the idea that property prices rarely 
if ever fall have proved to be too optimistic. Moreover, a 
return to the extremely easy credit terms prevailing before 
the crisis is highly unlikely, and even undesirable. In the 
coming years, these factors mean that American house-
holds are likely to consume at a more modest pace than in 
the period 1992-2007 and will therefore cease to perform 
the role of world consumer of last resort.
That is why many people put their hopes in the Asian 
economies as drivers of global demand. In any case, they 
were the first to recover from the international economic 
and financial crisis. The rapid GDP growth in the region 
already seems to be firmly anchored. The World Bank 
predicts growth of 8.7 p.c. this year in the emerging Far 
East economies. The shift in the centre of gravity of global 
demand towards those regions therefore seems to have 
accelerated. China, the largest emerging economy, was at 
the centre of the region’s economic recovery, making the 
biggest contribution to global economic growth in 2009.
However, one question remains  : to what extent will a 
  reorientation of the Chinese growth model be sufficient 
to ensure a sustainable global economic recovery ? 
Chart 9  private conSuMption in 2007
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Although China’s share in global GDP has increased con-
siderably, that growth has been accompanied by a steep 
increase in the household savings ratio, while Chinese 
growth has remained largely dependent on sales to the 
advanced economies, whose growth prospects for the 
coming years are less favourable. The scale of private con-
sumption in China currently appears insufficient to com-
pensate for the slackening pace of growth of American 
consumption. In view of their relative size, China would 
have to speed up consumption growth by seven times as 
much as the slowdown in US consumption.
Moreover, despite strong growth of its imports of con-
sumption goods (up 15 p.c. on average over the past 
fifteen years, against a world average of 10 p.c.), China 
remains a marginal player in that respect owing to the 
small share of Chinese private consumption in the world 
total and a much smaller imported component in private 
consumption. Consequently, China’s contribution to the 
growth of world imports of consumption goods has been 
relatively small (around 4 p.c. in recent years).
Furthermore, there are significant differences between the 
consumption goods imported into China and imports into 
the US  ; only 35 p.c. of China’s basket of consumption 
goods is comparable to that of the United States. The 
composition of global demand will ultimately change 
as demand shifts towards the emerging economies. The 
changing consumption patterns at world level will there-
fore require modifications to production structures  ; if 
that sectoral reorganisation is to go smoothly, capital and 
labour markets need to be flexible.
Since structural measures take effect in the medium term 
at best, the restoration of the global balance will probably 
encounter a transitional phase in which the declining role 
of American consumption cannot be entirely offset by 
demand from other countries. Progress towards a new, 
sustainable balance is therefore liable to take a long time 
and entail a slowdown in global growth.
Leaving aside the medium-term outcome of structural 
reforms, there are several promising developments 
emerging in the longer term. Thus, according to the life 
cycle theory, the expected increase in the dependency 
ratio in the emerging economies (except India, Brazil and 
Indonesia) could depress savings ratios in the coming dec-
ades. Also, a higher level of prosperity could create a new 
middle class with considerable consumption potential. 
That effect is likely to be felt mainly in the most heavily 
populated countries, such as India and China, and will 
ultimately have a significant effect on consumption pat-
terns at the global level. At the same time, there could be 
significant shifts in consumption patterns away from food 
and clothing and towards energy and consumer durables. 
That is why this development could well be accompanied 
by increasing competition for scarce energy resources and 
a larger impact on the environment.
Conclusion
Sustainable, balanced growth of the global economy 
requires a radical change of policy on the part of countries 
with substantial external and internal imbalances.
Deficit countries will have to cut the sizeable current 
account deficits which they have accumulated as a result 
of producing less than they spend and saving less than 
they invest. They will need to adjust their spending and 
concentrate on the export sector. The sectoral shifts 
and redistributive effects which will accompany internal 
rebalancing will create tensions between winners and 
losers. It will not be easy to restore the macroeconomic 
balance while achieving a social and political consensus 
and creating the conditions for future growth, especially 
in the case of countries where the crisis has caused a 
substantial increase in the public debt. Even the gradual 
reduction of heavy public deficits could usher in a period 
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of low growth. Countries with significant competitive-
ness problems will also face a major challenge. In view of 
the rigidity of the product and labour markets, regaining 
competitiveness will inevitably be a lengthy and painful 
process for those countries.
To compensate for the decline in demand from deficit 
countries, surplus countries are called upon to act  : if 
domestic demand does not increase in those countries, 
the world economy could face a shortage of aggregate 
demand and an excess of production capacity. The sur-
plus countries will have to reduce their dependence on 
exports, which implies refocusing their growth model on 
the domestic market. Here, too, the process will gener-
ate political tensions. In China, the industrial sector has 
been central to the economic, social and political order 
for many years. Eliminating the privileges granted to that 
sector will entail shifts of power in all those spheres.
However, there are some encouraging signs. Thus, China 
is becoming increasingly aware of the need to promote 
domestic consumption rather than exports and export-
related investment. Vigorous growth and relatively sound 
public finances give China precisely the preconditions 
required for that shift of focus. The political will exists. 
Moreover, China is a centrally managed economy which, 
in the past, has already demonstrated that it can imple-
ment drastic reforms in a relatively short space of time. 
Conversely, the United States recognises the need to 
consolidate public finances and stimulate exports  ; it could 
return to consumption-led growth, but the benefits would 
probably be transient and the latent distortions which 
caused the crisis, would persist, probably until the eruption 
of a new crisis. If these promising policy intentions become 
reality, the global economy could benefit. The efforts 
needed to consolidate the fragile recovery which followed 
the crisis will be considerable, and must begin right away.
Nonetheless, the rebalancing of the global economy 
remains a major challenge with potential for tensions 
between countries over the allocation of the negative 
wealth effects. Hence the importance of an international 
platform capable of offering a global and powerful policy 
response, with a role for all deficit and surplus economies. 
In that regard, the commitment by the leaders of the G20 
countries to implement the Framework is grounds for 
optimism. Yet, it is vital to set up an effective system of 
monitoring progress in surplus and deficit countries, to 
impose discipline and to exert peer pressure. The G20 will 
play a crucial role here too.37
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